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4 z - r l l/ .  Summary ano concluslon
Investing in equity has historically provided investors with a return above r'vhat
coulii rationally be expected. This is the cli,rirn Mehla and Plcscott [ 985] put ltrrth
two decades ago. Neoclassical theory is unable tcl explain u"hy the return ott risky
equrtyhas exceeded the risk fiee rate of retum by so much. lt lxust bc that either
consumers do not behave as theory predicts or it is an ctlpirical issue, possibly
arising only fbr a parlicular sample period or country. We started our study on the
equity risk prernium rvith an overvieu' ol' the literatul'c. ln Chaptcr 2 rve
demonstrated that the excess return equity has enjoyed over bonds is f-airly stable
across time and that the same phenomenon is gbservable in many developed
ec0nomles.
There are several rvays to improve the basic equity risk premiutr, modcl. We
hal'e listed sonre and shorvn that the most promising studies fircus otl eithcr nrarket
inefficiencies or on changes to the standard utility frarnework. The inability o1'
young agents to borro'uv and invest in equity markets is an ilrportant argument fbr
the high excess return of equity. Habit persistence could be a reasonablc altctrtative
explanation. Whilst these theoretical advances go a long uay towards solving the
equity risk prernium puzzle, the puzzle stil l rcrnains. No cttrretrt rnodel generates the
equity premium with a low and relatively constant intcrest rate, low risk aversion,
preclictability of equity returns and consuurption that is roughly a random walk. This
leads ome to argue that any hope of tickling, or tofiuring, some reasoltablc ureasure
of the risk premium out of consumption data is fbrlom; it resides on the hope that
investors are rational. We did not dwell much ot.t irrationality issues, but note tltat
progress in the field of behavioural finance is leading to some pronrising results.
Orr the empirical side. the magnitude of the excess retunt is independent of the
choice of the sarnple period as Siegel [ 1992,1998] shows. Moreover, it is robust o
the selection of developed markets (eg, Campbell [1999] ancl Dimsotr etal. [2001]).
However, one of the arguments tbr the [righ excess retllnls ort eqttity is that wc all
sturly successful and developed equity rnarket(s); in etfect this boils down to
picking a biased sample since tlre rate ol success nright not havc beett expectecl ex
ante. Major advances in the empirical research on ecluity markets have used
fundamentals (dividends and/or earnings) as a guide 1br expected equity return.
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Fanra and French [2002) have fbrcefully dernonstrated that unconditional expected
equity retums on US equity markets have been far shy of the actLral retums received.
Especially in the post-war period actual equity returns u'ere far higher than
reasonably should have been expected. We concluded Chapter 2 by reviewing the
literature using furrdamentals to generate the ERP.
In Chapter 3 we modelled the equity risk premium in a long-run theoretical
gror,vth rnodel to identify its driving forces. When we assunte heterogeneity betrieen
equity and bonds, due to votitrg power and inflation, several factors can be shown to
aftect the ERP in theory: depreciation, marginal util ity of consumption and leisure.
Using a cross-sectional data set we flnd that the ERP is primarily determined by
prodr.rctivity g'owth, population growth and inflation.
In Chapter 4 we built upon the economic research of Bernanke t al. [1999] and
incorporated equity into a theoretical business cycle rnodel. It can be argued that
changes in equity prices amplify the business cycle and raise inflation via wealth
effects and collateral effects. This would justify the devoted attention of central
bankers. In a dynamic Nerv Keyrtesian business cycle framework we added
stochastic bubbles in equity markets and found that simple inf'lation targeting is
sufficient o smooth inflation and growth. There is no need to target equity prices
directly. However, the results do not mean that equity markets are irrelevant o
policy makers, as the eff-ects of leverage are substantial in a business cycles
framework. If policy makers are concerned about the detrimental atter-effects of
equity bubbles. attention shor.rld be dilected tor,vards credit.
From Chapter 5 onwards we were interested in the relevance of the
predictability of equity retunrs for finance practitioners. By examining long{erm
data for the United States equity markets and contrasting these data with that of
other major markets. we saw that investors in US equity have been fortunate. In
none of the other major developed markets has the excess retLrrn been so fbr above
expectation. One of the rnain reasons for these excess retums has been the change in
valuation ratios. We demonstrated that valuation mtios are mean levefting processes
and can be used as a guide to expected retum. The longer the investment horizon,
the better the predictability of valuation ratios fbr subsequent equify retums. Scaling
equity prices by trend eamings (ie, the past lO-year eamings in order to eliminate
business cycle effects) explains 30% of the variability of total real equity returns
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over a I O-year investment horizon in the sample period I 88 I - 2003. For investors,
this is a deep insight, which should guide their strategic asset allocation decisions.
We also shattered a widespread misconception that plagues many investors: the
conventional view that models that compare the eamings yield and the bond yield
add value to the investment process. Such models are theoretically flawed, do not
pass the empirical tests, and long-tenn investors hould ignore them.
The main message is that absolute valuations are a prime determinant of future
returns; historical retums are a poor guide for the future. Seeing that current
valuations are far above their long-tenrr averages does not bode well fbr equity
retums. We hold the view that the recent revaluation of equity is only transitory.
Mean reversion will bring valuation ratios back in line with the historical nonl.
History suggests that this can be achieved via a period of stagnating prices and
nsing earnings (see 1900 - I 920), or that prices will tall (see 1930).
Chapter 6 extended the equity risk premiurn work to emerging rlarkets. First
our study on emerging markets showed that excess returns in those markets,
measllred in US$ ternls, surpass those of developed markets. This even holds after
correcting for the standard deviation of excess return. Horvever, we also note that
standard risk measures do not capture fully the perceived risks of investors. Ifthings
go wrong, the damage is severe and the "true" risk in emerging markets is only laid
bare when dorvnside risk measures are used. lnvestors looking to take advantage of
the excess returxs should keep that in mind. It is also noted that excess returns il)
those rnarkets are varying across time and corelated rvith the global economic
cycle. Excess returns in emerging markets seem to be cyclically determined. not
structural; there is no evidence of a ditference in excess return arisin.q fronr
liberalisation.
Next we applied the notion that valuation ratios predict subsequeut returns to
ernerging markets. We showed that in a cross-section of emerging rnarket countries
a portfolio of value (low price-to-book) countries outperfbtms a porttblio of growth
(high price-to book) countries. Moreover, we link this superior perfbrnrance to the
development of several macroeconomic indicators and show that investors in
enrerging market countries seem to extrapolate past economic developrnents.
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7.1 Implications of low expected equity returns
It is evident that understanding the process driving the equity risk premium is
crLrcial for pro-uress in many important problems in (financial) economics. We need
a reliable ERP fbr proper asset allocation, we must apply appropriate hurdle rates
firr invcstrlents, ancl we should value asset markets accurately. This section offers
tu,o flnal thoughts or.l sonre practical implicatiorrs.
First, following two decades of enormously favourable quity returns, valuation
ratios arc stletched: US dividcnd yielcls are at historic lorvs and price-to-eanrines
ratios are at lcast oue standard eviation above their long term average. Where does
this lcave expected equity retums? Based on the data available at the end of 2003
and the nrethodologies out l ined in this thesis,  we can only conclude that equity
returns will be below average and investors f-ace aslender ERP. All approaches lead
to broadly simi lar conclusions:
l. The tlend earnings yield is around 3.7oh, which. based on the
estimation results linking earnings yield and subsequent returns (see
Table 5.7),  caps real total  equity retums for the coming l0 years at
roughly 3%. With a real 10-year bond yield of around 2o/o,this leads to
an ERP o f  on ly  l%.
2. Combining dividend yield ( 1 .60/o) and eamings growth (fbr lack of a
reliable estimate for future growth we take the histolical average of
1.6% tionr Table 5.2) results in an expected real total equity return of
3.2o .lt must be stressed that we abstract fiom changes in valuation
ratios. If-one fufiher assumes that the price-to-trend-earnings ratio will
revert back to its historic rnean (or worse), equity returns will be even
lower. Combined with the real bond vield. this leads to an ERP of
1 .29 /o .
3. Finally, the Rozefl'[ 984] methocl of using the dividend yield as the
best proxy fclr the equity risk premir.rm results in an ERP of 1.6%.
The implications fionr this lower equity risk premium are substantial. By way of
illustration we replicate Figure I .1, which calculated the worst possible outcomes
ftx an ERP based on our lprovocatively labelledl 'sensible' equity returns. With this
1.5% ERP, the worst rcasonable outcome would never get much r,vorse than -82%!
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Equity returns would finally suqlass bond returns with t)5% confldence after a long
wait of 220 years. Naturally, if you're willing to settle fbr an 80% or 90%
confidence l vel. the time sDan will be shofter.
Figure 7.1: Worst possible outcomes lbr a sensible ERP.
The l igure g i res the \ , \ ( ) r 's t  p()ss ib; .  1- \ ' r 'pr rc . 'n t i le)  t ru lc t r rnes r t  d i l ' l ! rent  i r r ies l r ler r t
horizons tbr our best estimate of the ERP (1.5910). It is the left tail of a probabil itv
distribution slrorving the excess return oiequity 1o bonds. Investors have a 9596 chance of
seeing better returns on cquity. For comparisoll, l i l ' t : also 
-qraph an ERP of .1.5!/o, u,hich is
the historical sxcess return on equity. Both probabil it ies are calculated using the sante
standard deviaticln of 13.5%. the historical standard eviation of excess returns in US data
for the period l87l - 2003. The algorithrr usecl ttr gc'neratc thc 5'r ' pcrccnti le in vcar r is:
r*ERP- I  .645* 1 3.5%*r / t .
<F-
f .RP 1 .50
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I  n \  cs tment  hor izon  ( \  ears l
The implied low expected equity returns cornbined rvith low dividend yield are
even more profound for investors in the spending phases of the lif 'e cycle. ln
extrelnis, investors rnight end up in a position where they need to dra*' dor,r'n their
capital base for consumption if returns are insufllcient. Here investors care about
shorl-term volatility and, as Benartzi and Thaler [ 1995] show, loss aversion is then
unavoidable. When expected retllrns are low having a long investrrent horizon is an
illusion. An example nright be ilh,rstrative. Consider tlie case of a hypothetical
insurance company that has (mostly) guaranteed liabilities with a long duration. In
order to match these liabilities the assets need to have a long duration and tend to be
invested in bonds, which currently matches the duration, but does not ensLlre that
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returns are sufficient o meet the liabilities. The insurance company neecls to add
equity to capture the equity risk premium. In a world with low expected equity
retum the probability of a large (-10%) negative excess return in a parlicular year
rises substantially (see Table 7.1) compared to the probabilities calculated Lrsing
histor ical  returns (see Table l . l ) .  When negat ive ret l l rns occur,  the insurance
company tlnds itself in a position where curtent cash flows cannot be met and needs
to draw down or replenish capital. In a position where the regulator is increasingly
forcing conrpanies to mark-to-market heir assets, investors care about the shorl-
tenn volatility and the evaluation horizon shoftens. So even rvhile eqLrity is likely to
return rnore than bonds in the long run, the probability of a negative return might
force long-term investors out of the equity markets for fear of short tetm losses.
Policy makers should keep this in mind when setting rules for solvency.
Table 7.1: Probability of loss with sensible returns.
In this table we report the probabilities ofa l0% loss of equity relative to bonds as defined
by a (A) average annual loss, (B) cumulative loss, (C) loss of at least 100% in at leastone
period and (D) cumulative loss of l}o/u at some point. Returns are based on an equity risk
premium of 1.5% and standard deviat ion of 13.5%, the histor ical  standard deviat ion of
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Second, low expected returns will cause a revolutionary change in the asset
managelnent industry. It will be pushed more lowards absolute retLrm (alpha)
slratcgics. , \rrsort [2OO1l cl ir . idcs thc assct al location dccjsiorr irr to tu'o asscf classes:
beta drivers and alpha drivers. Beta drivers, which provide broad economic
exposure to the financial markets, are established by the strategic asset allocation
decision. Alpha drivers are desi-qned to plovide added return beyond the return
offerecl through passive exposure to the flnancial markets. Alpha drivers, chosen as
part of the tactical asset allocation decision, are designed to facilitate the investment
objectives by seeking added value. When expected returns are low, benchmark
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(beta) r'eturns are lo'lv and beta dril,ers are insufficient. As the example above
shows, meeting investment objectives with strategic asset allocation alone is
problernatic.36 In a low return environrneut the need fbr active management of
(equity) portfblios increases (Bernstein [2003b] and Molinas [2003]). Broacily
speaking, there are two ways of achieving this: the first fbcuses on absolute returns
(Kneaf'sey [2003]) and the second on market iming (Bernstein [2003a]), or tactical
asset allocation. Kneaf-sey's view is that the asset management industry should get
rid of benchrnarks, ending their almost sacrosanct s atus. Berrrstein argues that, u,ith
the trend fiom ever-rising valuations gone (and likely in reverse), the cycle gets
more impoftant. lnvesting over the business cycle and timing the markets are
crucia[.
The importance of active management is clear, but so are the risks. During the
1980s and 1990s the need fbr an extra percentage point via active management was
negligible on the total retums achieved. In addition, actual retums have been higher
than wlrat could reasorrably have been erpected. It rvas easy to meet investment
targets even if one was wrong in one's fbrecast or asset allocation because returns
were fbrgiving. Nowadays, in a world of low expected returns, the extra active
percentage point is really needed and could decide whether liabilities are met or not.
However, the risks of active management have also risen; it could well precipitate
insolvency. Not making the retums needed and tailing to meet liabilities is
precarious; large forecast errors and/or asset allocation mistakes rnay be disastrous.
7.2 Research agenda
A wide range of different topics has been covered in this study. In our vierv three
topics are promising, thought provoking, and deserve futule research. First, in our
study on the issue of equity in rrionetary policy w'e noted that several observers
claim that bubbles will autornatically unravel, lirniting social costs. More studies on
how bubbles are formed and prolonged are probably needed and a link with
36 Bemstein [2003a] provocatively states that policy portfblios are obsolete. Kneafiey
[2003] thinks that this is pushing it too fhr. His view is that policy portfblios are simply
mismanaged as they need to satisfy two objectives (match l iabil i t ies and add value) in one.
In h is  v iew the decis ions hould be sepalated.  F i rs t  you nratch l iab i l i t ies.  Next  you add
value via a range ofalpha type products.
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stnlctures in the asset management industry bears thinking abor-rt. A bubble reflects,
arxong other things. a lack of stabilising speculation. The rise of index tracking has
been a boou fbr retail investors, but not fbr the u,ider market place since index
trackers arc the opposite of contrarians. For them, as f-ar as equity market valuations
are concerned, u,hat is is right. And then, of course, we have closet inde.ring, which
reflects the portfolio managers' desire to minirnise business risk (tracking error
versus the index). As r,vell as being a dereliction of fiduciary duty. this is an opt-out
fi 'om the stabilising speculator's role. The structure of the asset management
industry is such that while you can identify a bubble, the pressure for short-term
perfbrmance still pushes the bubble to morc extrernes (see Montier'[2004]). It rnight
well be the case that thc private sector knou's it is a bubble, but that it does not
unravel because rnolrentuu'r and agency theory prolong and extend overvaluation
even rvhcn investors are fLrlly aware of it. It is stil l uncertain what the eventual
sociaI costs of thc 1990s bubble and subsequent collapse in the tlrst decade of the
2l" century u' i l l  be. Howcver.  instead of damage control  in the post bubble world.  i t
would be lascinating to study the breeding groLrnd conditions because most
obselvers agree that bubbles are unclesilable. Is it possible to contain bubbles by
changing the rules of the garne'/
Second. related to this debate on rlonetary policy is the irnportance of the
financial structure. It r,r,as noted that there is no need for policy makers to target
equity prices directly, but that this should not be taken as a sign to ignore them
cornplete ly. Various authors have argued that diflerences in financial structure lead
to substantial difJbrences in mtlnetary policy transmission mechanism with bank
based econonrics being more volatile in comparison to market-based conomies due
to lack of alternative financing (BIS [995], Kashyap and Stein [997] and
Cecchetti I I 999] provide evidence lbr the EMU). We have just lived trough one of
the biggest equity bubbles of all time's. Yet it has not (yet) been followed by a
finarrcial crisis. Why'? What was diffbrent was the spread of equity holdings arnong
a wicle spectrum of economic agents. This leduces the risk of systemic banking
problems. To us. this suggests that policy makers should encourage operr and
transparent rlarkets, deeper financial rnarkets, and risk spreading among nrore
investors. Greenu,ald and Stiglitz [2003] have noted that alternative sources of
flnance are key and equity rationing should be minimised. It might be argued that
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policy rnakers hould be touting the virtues of equity to srlpplement bank lending.
Linking financial structure with monetary policy rvill rernain an interesting topic fbr
further studies.
Third, f'uture research should be airned at delving deeper into the demographic
aspects of equity markets. The ERP is not a single nurrrber but a quantity that varies
though time r,r,ith denrographics and evolutionary phenomena. It is also not a
universal concept like the speed of light or gravity. There are two avenues along
which to proceed. First there is the evolutionary approach which states that the ERP
is determined by the nature of the specific population at hand, whose risk
preferences are determined by their collective past experiences in a path-dependent
u'ay. Someone brought up in the midst of the Great Depression rvill be less inclined
to buy the dips as opposed to someone whose risk preferences were shaped in the
1980s and 1990s. The point is that the history of market conditions and economic
cycles determines the risk preferences of individLrals in the market place today. Holv
likely is it that the experiences change over the next 10 years ',vhen the population
changes? Second is the issue of supply trnd demand in an aging society. Within the
developed world, a whole cohofi of baby boomers is and will be retiring frorn the
labour force. This view has led Poterba [2001] and Arnott and Casscells [2003] to
sound the alann bell. More retirees than ever before u'il l be selling assets to a
proportionately smaller roster of potential buyers. Dernographics that arguably
played a pafi in the bull market rvill now cap future returns. Geanakoplos et al.
120021have examined the predictability of equity returns from this approach.
This study has examined equity markets frorn several non-exclusive angles; fbr
a deeper understanding of the drivers of equity markets a wide range of topics is
important. The risks and reu,ards of equity are detennined in a melting pot that
includes pure macroecouomics, valuation theory. psychology and demographics.
The quest fbr the answer to the equity risk puzzle continues. Since the study of
economics and of financial markets rernains a study of hurnan behaviour, we doubt
a definitive answer will ever be fbund. Luckily, that ensures that equity markets will
remain as excitins as ever.
